Georgia Law Review
Volume 52

Number 3

Article 9

2018

Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail
Systems and Their Continued Use Throughout the United States
Margaret E. Margaret
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Margaret, Margaret E. (2018) "Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail Systems and
Their Continued Use Throughout the United States," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 52: No. 3, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Margaret: Bailing on Bail: The Unconstitutionality of Fixed, Monetary Bail

BAILING ON BAIL: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIXED,
MONETARY BAIL SYSTEMS AND THEIR
CONTINUED USE THROUGHOUT THE
UNITED STATES
MargaretElizabeth Sparks*
Incarceratingdefendants prior to trial was designed to be
the exception, not the norm. Many state and local
jurisdictionsthroughout the United States, however, employ
fixed, monetary bail systems that result in the systematic pretrial incarcerationof indigent defendants solely because of
their inability to pay for their release. Not only do such bail
systems violate indigent defendants' constitutional rights,
they also contribute to the billions spent by local governments
each year on maintainingovercrowdedjails and have lasting
effects on those indigent defendants wrongfully detained.
This Note explores the constitutionalityof fixed, monetary
bail systems through the lens of a recent Georgiacase, Walker
v. City of Calhoun. The bail system at issue in Walker, which
sets offense-based, pre-fixed bail amounts for misdemeanor
and traffic offenses, violates indigent defendants' due process
and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Further, this Note explains that the City of
Calhoun's bail system is not alone. Many other jurisdictions
continue to employ similar bail systems that result in the
disproportionateincarcerationof indigent defendants. This
Note concludes by offering recommendationsfor changing the
state of the law regardingbail administrationand practical
advice for implementing new systems that will assure
appearance at trial and public safety, without violating
defendants' constitutionalrights.

J.D. Candidate, University of Georgia School of Law, 2018; B.A. in Journalism, University
of Georgia, 2015. Special thanks to the editors of the Georgia Law Review for their hard work
and revisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The undisputed aim of the American criminal justice system is
to administer justice fairly, irrespective of wealth or status.
Incarcerating criminal defendants prior to an adjudication of guilt
solely because of their inability to pay for their release contradicts
this basic premise. Yet, jurisdictions throughout the United States,
and specifically in the state of Georgia, employ fixed, monetary bail
systems that result in the incarceration of defendants for petty
offenses solely because of their indigency. These bail systems not
only violate the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, but
they also contribute to the billions spent by local governments on
maintaining overcrowded jails.1
"In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception." 2 According to the
Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, it is only within this
"carefully limited exception" that pretrial conditions may be
imposed or release can be denied to further legitimate state goals,
like preventing the flight of a defendant before trial or protecting
the public from danger posed by a defendant's release. 3 Even
though these goals can be achieved through "the imposition of
nonmonetary conditions, such as supervised release or reasonable
restrictions on [defendants'] activities and movements," 4 financial
conditions have become the norm in many jurisdictions throughout
the United States. 5 Despite increased efforts in the 1960s to combat
these unconstitutional systems, many jurisdictions today continue
to maintain fixed, monetary bail systems that "incarcerate people
without regard for indigency."6 Further, the majority of past reform

I

See Richard Williams, Bail or Jail,ST. LEGISLATURES MAG., May 2012, at 30, 30 (noting
that local governments spent $9 billion on jails in 2012).
2 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
3 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging
Affirmance on the Issue Addressed Herein at 4-5, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir.
2017) (No. 16-10521-HH) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55).
4 Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release
§§ 10-1.4, 10-5.2 (3d ed. 2007),
http://www. americanbar.org/publications/criminal iusticesection archive/crimjust standar
ds pretrialrelease-blk.html#10-1.1).
5 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Walker, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM,
2016 WL 361612 (No. 16-10521-HH) (noting that many jurisdictions do not consider indigency
when setting bail).
6 Id.
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efforts have focused on reforming the federal bail system, without
regard to the continued use of fixed, monetary bail systems in many
state and local jurisdictions.
The impact of these bail systems has not been insignificant.
While jails are intended to house only those pre-trial defendants
who are deemed a flight risk or a danger to the public, today's jails
hold massive numbers of pretrial detainees charged with minor
offenses simply because they are unable to afford modest bail.' As
a result, local jails are increasingly overcrowded. According to the
Department of Justice, in 2013, 62% of all jail inmates in the United
States were not convicted of their alleged offenses.8 In 2014, the
Department of Justice reported that there were approximately
467,500 people detained in local jails awaiting trial, up from 349,800
in 2000. 9 And, "while jails do hold people accused of serious, violent
crimes, nearly 75 percent of the population . . . are in jail for
nonviolent traffic, property, drug, or public order offenses." 10
The costs of pretrial detention go beyond the financial impact of
overcrowded jails on local governments. Although most pretrial
detainees are released from jail fairly quickly, even a short stay in
jail can have a lasting impact on a defendant." Spending a few days
in jail can increase the likelihood of future incarceration, increase
in the harshness of future sentences, reduce economic viability, and
promote future criminal behavior. 12 Research also suggests that
defendants who are detained prior to trial often "receive and accept
less favorable plea agreements" because they "do not have the

7 See RAM SUBRAMANIAN, RUTH DELANEY, STEPHEN ROBERTS, NANCY FISHMAN & PEGGY
MCGARRY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION'S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN

AMERICA 4 (2015) ("Jails have become massive warehouses primarily for those too poor to
post even low bail or too sick for existing community resources to manage.").
8 Id. at 5 (citing TODD D. MINTON AND DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES 11 (2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim 13st.pdf).
9 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
MisdemeanorPretrialDetention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2017) (citing TODD D. MINTON &
ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 1 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim 14.pdf).
10 SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 7, at 4.
11 See id. (explaining that being detained, even for just a short period, "is often the
beginning of a journey through the criminal justice system that can take many wrong turns").
12 See id. (stating that jail is often "a gateway to deeper and more lasting involvement in
the criminal justice system at considerable costs to the people involved and to society at
large").
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leverage to press for better ones." 13 For the small number of
defendants who end up going to trial, those who were detained prior
to trial are often viewed more harshly by jurors. 14 Thus, while some
view these pretrial detentions as short and harmless, these
detentions have severe and lasting consequences on defendants.
Despite the long-term consequences of pretrial detention, many
state and local jurisdictions continue to maintain systems that
result in the incarceration of indigent defendants for misdemeanor
offenses simply because of their inability to afford modest bail. Such
systems violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they fail to
consider a defendant's ability to pay for release or alternative
methods of assuring appearance at trial and protection of the
Recently, a class of plaintiffs challenged the
public. 15
constitutionality of a fixed, monetary bail system in Calhoun,
Georgia. 16 In granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia ordered the City of Calhoun to "implement postarrest procedures that comply with the Constitution." 17 The district
court stated that the plaintiffs had a "substantial likelihood of
succeeding on the merits" of their claims because "[a]ny bail or bond
scheme that mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different
offenses to obtain pretrial release, without any consideration of
indigence or other factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause."18
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, vacated the
preliminary injunction based on lack of specificity and remanded
the case back to the district court. 19
13 See id. at 14 (In a recent study conducted by the Arnold Foundation, results indicated
that these "harsher sentences held even for those detained for only a few days .... ").
14 See id. (stating that research has shown "jurors tend to view defendants brought to court
in jail uniforms and shackles as guilty regardless of the merits of the case").
15 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No.
4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721
(11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH) (taking the position that the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals should affirm the district court's holding in Walker because the bail system in
Calhoun, Georgia, violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
16 See generally Complaint, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL
361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 4:15-cv00170).
17 Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *14.
18 Id. at *10.
19 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 F. App'x 721, 724 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
district court's preliminary injunction violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65's specificity
requirements).
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not reach the merits
of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, leaving open the question of
whether fixed, monetary bail systems that mandate payment of prefixed amounts for different offenses to obtain pretrial release violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the
constitutional claims had been reached, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals should have found that the City of Calhoun's bail scheme,
and other similar schemes, violate the Fourteenth Amendment
because they fail to consider a defendant's indigence or other
individualized factors. Further, as a matter of public policy, such
systems result in the unnecessary incarceration of indigent
defendants, impeding the fair administration of justice in our
20
country.
This Note discusses the operation of fixed, monetary bail systems
in many state and local jurisdictions throughout the United States
and analyzes Walker v. City of Calhoun, the Georgia case recently
remanded by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Part II of this
Note surveys the history of bail and pretrial release, includes a brief
overview of the federal bail system, and discusses the relevant facts
and procedural history of Walker. Part III analyzes case law
regarding the constitutionality of fixed, monetary bail systems
through the lens of Walker, concluding that the City of Calhoun's
bail scheme violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Part III also
notes the presence of local jurisdictions throughout the country that
continue to employ similar unconstitutional bail schemes. Finally,
Part III offers recommendations for changing the state of the law
regarding bail schemes and offers practical advice for implementing
new systems that will aim to assure appearance at trial and public
safety, without violating defendants' constitutional rights.

II.BACKGROUND
The following section of this Note summarizes the history of bail
and pretrial release in the United States, discussing the origins of
bail, the development of modern bail administration, and past
reform efforts. This section also provides a background of Walker v.

20 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Walker, 2016 WL 361612 (No.
16-10521-HH) (noting the constitutional and public policy concerns surrounding such
systems).
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City of Calhoun, which discusses the relevant facts of the case, the
bail system at issue, and the case's procedural history.
A. THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THE UNITED
STATES

The American notion of bail has English roots. 2 1 Initially, the
early American colonies "applied English law [in this area]
verbatim." 22 As a result of differences in "beliefs about criminal
justice," "colonial customs," and "crimes rates between England and
the colonies," the American colonies began to develop new practices
regarding the administration of bail. 23 For example, Massachusetts
passed its Body of Liberties in 1641, which created "an unequivocal
right to bail for non-capital cases." 24 In 1682, Pennsylvania also
adopted a more liberal bail provision that stated "all prisoners shall
be [b]ailable by [s]ufficient [s]ureties, unless for capital [o]ffenses,
where proof is evident or the presumption great." 25 Other colonies
quickly copied Pennsylvania's liberal approach, and as the new
country began to grow, Pennsylvania "became the model for almost
every state constitution adopted after 1776.26
Bail provisions in state constitutions are especially important
because "[tihere is no explicit right to bail in the U.S.
Constitution." 27 "[T]he Constitution does not define which crimes
are bailable, nor which defendants can be detained." 28 The
Constitution, however, does cover the right to habeas corpus in
Article I, Section 9, and it includes a prohibition against "excessive
bail" in the Eighth Amendment. 29 Additionally, Congress passed
Section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which "granted an absolute
21 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M.B. BROOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE
INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 1 (2010).

22 Id. at 4 (discussing the status of English law at the time of American independence).
23 Id.
24 Id.

25 Id. (quoting June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Rediscovery of
Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531 (1983)); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 14.
26 SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 5 (quoting Carbone, supranote 25, at 532).
27 Id.
28

Id.

29 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not

be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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right to bail in non-capital federal criminal cases." 30 By the early
1800s, the fundamental ideas of bail, set forth in both the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment and the Judiciary Act of 1789,
could be summarized as follows: "(1) Bail should not be excessive,
(2) A right to bail exists in non-capital cases, and (3) Bail is meant
31
to assure the appearance of the accused at trial."
As the new country continued to grow, however, the
administration of bail faced many new challenges. For example, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the individual who
posted bail and guaranteed the appearance of a defendant at trial
was usually a "friend, relative, or employer of the accused." 32 "[T]he
absence of close friends and neighbors in frontier America" made it
difficult for the courts to locate acceptable custodians for many
defendants.3 3 Additionally, increasing delays between accusation
and trial placed new importance on pretrial release. 34 Thus,
commercial bonds, which were never permitted in England, became
35
a useful and commonly-used device in the United States.
While there is some debate over when the commercial bail bond
industry actually began, the industry began flourishing in the early
1900s as "a growing number of defendants fac[ed] increasingly
higher money bail bond amounts." 36 Bondsmen would post the
amount of the bail bond for a fee. 37 Because the bondsmen would be
liable if the defendants fled, they also required collateral or

3o SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 5 (explaining that with the Judiciary Act, the federal
government "joined a number of states, which, through their respective constitutions,
provided a right to bail for nearly all defendants").
31 Id.

(quoting

JUSZKIEWICZ,

SPURGEON KENNEDY, D. ALAN HENRY, JOHN CLARK & JOLANTA
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND SUPERVISION PROGRAM: TRAINING SUPPLEMENT 2

(Pretrial Servs. Res. Ctr. eds., 1997)).
32 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROSECUTING
CRIME 797 (West ed., 5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the personal relationship between the
defendant and the surety-the individual who posted the bail-was as important as the
monetary payment in assuring the defendant's appearance at trial).
33 SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN
AMERICA 11-12 (Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1976)).
34 Id. (quoting Carbone, supra note 25, at 522).
35 Id.
("[A]rbitrary money bail bond amounts, coupled with a growing number of
defendants who were unable to pay them.., combined to give birth to a profession unique to
the field of American criminal justice-the commercial money bail bond industry."); see also
DRESSLER & THOMAS, III, supra note 32, at 797 (noting that "commercial bondsmen gradually
replaced private sureties" as the population grew more mobile in the nineteenth century).
36 SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 7.

37 DRESSLER & THOMAS, III, supra note 32, at 797.
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indemnification if the bonds were forfeited due to nonappearance. 38
Despite claims that this practice was contrary to public policy, it
39
became well established by the end of the nineteenth century.
This transition to a commercial bail bond industry "moved the
pretrial release decision out of court control and into the hands of
the bondsmen," meaning that a criminal defendant's freedom
40
largely depended on one factor-his or her ability to pay.
Criticism of this commercial bail industry went largely
unreported until Arthur Beeley published his landmark study, The
Bail System in Chicago, in 1927.41 In his study, Beeley criticized
the inequities of the bail system and discussed alternative methods,
other than surety bail, to effectuate pretrial release. 4 2 Similar
studies in Cleveland and Missouri were also published, but these
early efforts to combat monetary bail systems had little practical
43
effect.
Finally, in 1951, the Supreme Court decided Stack v. Boyle, "the
first major Supreme Court case addressing issues in the
administration of bail."44 In Stack, twelve federal defendants moved
to reduce their bail amounts "on the ground that bail as fixed was
The defendants
excessive under the Eighth Amendment." 45
submitted evidence of "their financial resources, family
relationships, health, prior criminal records, and other information"

38 Id. at 797-98.

39 Id. at 798 (stating that this practice was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1912).
40 See id. ("In a jurisdiction that relies on money bail, a judicial officer sets bail in a specific
amount or, alternatively, sets bail mechanically by reference to a 'bail schedule' that fixes
bond amounts in accordance with the seriousness of the charge. To obtain release on surety
bond, the defendant has to be able and willing to pay the bondsman a nonrefundable fee,
typically 10 percent of the bond. The defendant may also need to be able to provide collateral
equal to or greater than the bond. Even then, the bondsman may decline to do business with
defendants deemed to be bad risks.").
41 SCHNACKE, supranote 21, at 7 (citing WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA
13 (Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1976)).

See generally ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN

CHICAGO (Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1966).
42 SCHNACKE, supranote 21, at 7 (citing WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA

13 (Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1976)) ("Beeley found that bail amounts were based solely on the
alleged offense and that about 20 percent of the defendants were unable to post bail.").
43 See DRESSLER & THOMAS, III, supra note 32, at 798 ("Recurrent criticism of this system,
based on studies in Chicago, Cleveland, and the State of Missouri during the first quarter of
the 20th century, had scant impact.").
44 SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 8. See generally Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
45 Stack, 342 U.S. at 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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in support of their motion. 46 The defendants' motion was denied by
the lower courts, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 47 The
Court ultimately held that the bail amounts were unconstitutional
and excessive under the Eighth Amendment because the
government failed to produce sufficient evidence to justify why the
48
monetary bail amount was higher than usual for similar crimes.
This case, however, is "known for more than just its holding";49 the
Court used this case as an opportunity to express its views on bail
and articulate the reasons for a right to bail.50 The Court stated
that:
[firom the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the
present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46
(a)(1), federal law has unequivocally provided that a
person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be
admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom
before conviction permits the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail
before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
51
meaning.
The Court emphasized that bail should be based on an
52
individualized assessment of each defendant's circumstances.
Additionally, the Court noted that determining the amount of bail
to impose should be "based upon standards relevant to the purpose
53
of assuring the presence of that defendant."
Stack, 342 U.S. at 3.
See id. at 4 (stating that the petition for certiorari was granted "for review of questions
important to the administration of criminal justice").
48 See id. at 5 ("Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to
stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit
of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as an additional assurance of the presence of
an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment.").
49 SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 8.
50 See id. (stating that Stack was "the first expression of the Supreme Court's views on
bail" and that the case "includes ample language to support the notion that bail should only
be based on an individualized assessment of each defendant").
51 Id. (quoting Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (internal citations omitted)).
52 Id. (quoting Stack, 342 U.S. at 4).
5i Id. (quoting Stack, 342 U.S. at 4) (emphasis added).
46

47
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Four months later, the Court decided Carlson v. Landon, in
which the Court clarified that "the traditional right to freedom
54
before conviction in the federal system was not, in fact, absolute."
In Carlson,the Court discussed the English origins of the American
bail system and how there has never been an assertion that a right
to bail exists in all cases in English or American law. 55 The Court
explained that "the very language of the [Eighth] Amendment fails
to say all arrests must be bailable."56 These two cases, Stack and
Carlson, established the notion that while bail is a fundamental
precept of the American legal system, it is not absolute; when bail
is imposed, its parameters must be based on an individualized
57
assessment of each defendant.
By the early 1960s, many state legislators and courts began
expressing dissatisfaction with this system of monetary bail that
was being dominated by commercial bondsmen.5 8 In 1962, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, while testifying to Congress about the
problems associated with bail systems, brought "national attention
to the 'problem of bail,' pointing out that pretrial detention 'is
directly influenced by how wealthy [a defendant] is.' ,9 Under
Kennedy's leadership, the Department of Justice pushed for
expansive reforms on bail systems throughout the United States,
culminating in the Attorney General's National Conference on Bail
and Criminal Justice in 1964 and the Bail Reform Act of 1966.60

54

SCHNACKE, supranote 21, at 9; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).

55 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545 (explaining that "[tihe bail clause was lifted with slight

changes from the English Bill of Rights Act" and "that clause has never been thought to accord
a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases
where it is proper to grant bail").
56 Id. at 545-46.
57 See SCHNACKE, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that "while a right to bail is a fundamental
precept of the law, it is not absolute, and its parameters must be determined by federal and
possibly state legislatures" and explaining that "there must be an individualized
determination").
58 See id. at 10-11 (discussing rising dissatisfaction with the money bail bond system and
explaining that commercial money bail bondsmen had developed a reputation for corrupt and
abusive practices).
59 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH) (quoting Address by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Am.
9,
1962),
(Aug.
Justice
of
Dep't
of
Delegates,
House
Ass'n
Bar
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-06-1962 /20Pro.pdf).
60 Id. During his testimony to Congress, Kennedy discussed an individual who spent fiftyfour days in jail because he could not afford the $300 bail amount that was set for a traffic
offense. The maximum penalty for that traffic offense was only five days in jail. Id.
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These reform efforts centered on providing alternatives to
traditional monetary bail systems.6 1 Advocates for bail reform
pushed for alternatives, such as release on nonfinancial conditions
that restricted defendants' liberty in other ways or release under
"deposit bail" that would be posted directly with the court and
62
refunded if the defendant satisfied all pretrial release conditions.
Later legislation, however, increasingly focused on defendants'
danger to the community.6 3 On the federal level, the Bail Reform
Act was amended in 1984 to allow for consideration of danger when
assessing an individual defendant.6 4 The amended Act lists factors
that judicial officers should consider to assure the appearance of the
particular defendant at trial and to determine that defendant's risk
to the safety of the public. 65 Finally, the Bail Reform Act of 1984
included an express statement that a "judicial officer may not
impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of
the person," indicating Congress's goal of eliminating pretrial
detention of indigent defendants on the sole basis of their inability
66
to pay for their release.
Despite these efforts to reform federal bail practices throughout
the United States, many state and local jurisdictions, including
jurisdictions in Georgia, continue to maintain fixed, monetary bail
systems that incarcerate people without regard for indigency.
These systems mandate payments of pre-fixed amounts based on
the offenses charged, resulting in no individualized assessment of
defendants' ability to pay. Thus, defendants who cannot pay remain
detained. While past reform efforts have mostly succeeded on the
federal level, many state and local courts have yet to follow suit.

DRESSLER & THOMAS, III, supranote 32, at 798.
See id. at 798-99 (explaining that suggested alternatives to traditional bail fell into two
main categories-release on nonfinancial conditions and release under "deposit bail").
63 See id. at 799 (noting that during the 1970s and 1980s, legislation focused increasingly
on a defendant's potential danger to the community).
64 See id. (explaining that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 allowed for preventive detention in
limited circumstances when a defendant posed a significant threat of danger to the
community).
65 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018) (the judicial officer may consider
the following factors under the Act: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
weight of the evidence against the person, the history and characteristics of the person, and
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed
by the person).
66 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2018).
61
62
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B. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF WALKER V. CITY OF
CALHOUN

Maurice Walker is a fifty-four-year-old man suffering from a
67
mental disorder that renders him disabled and unable to work.
"His only income consists of approximately $530 per month in Social
Security disability payments, which are sent to and managed by his
sister."68 Mr. Walker, who lives with his sister, has no property or
69
other assets.
On September 3, 2015, Calhoun Police Department officers
arrested Mr. Walker for "allegedly being a pedestrian under the
influence."7 0 According to Mr. Walker's complaint, he was then
brought to Gordon County Jail, "where he was booked and placed in
a holding cell." 71 An officer told Mr. Walker that "he would not be
released [from custody] unless he paid the standard $160 cash bond
that the City [of Calhoun] requires for people charged with being a
pedestrian under the influence." 72 Because Mr. Walker was
73
financially unable to pay $160, he remained in jail for six nights.
Mr. Walker claims that he repeatedly asked officers when he would
have the opportunity to go to court, but he received a variety of
74
different responses.
Mr. Walker, along with others similarly situated, filed a class
action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City of
Calhoun employs an unconstitutional bail practice that "violates
[plaintiffs'] [Fourteenth Amendment] rights by jailing [those who]
67 Complaint at 3-4, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-00170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 4:15-cv-00170)
(noting that Mr. Walker "has not been able to work for the past five years" due to his
disability).
68 Id. at 3.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 4.
71

Id.

Id. (stating that "Mr. Walker is indigent," and neither he, nor his family, could afford to
pay $160 for his release from jail).
73 Id. at 5. It is important to note that the City of Calhoun holds weekly court sessions on
Mondays, and all "new arrestees who cannot afford to pay for their release must wait until
the following Monday to be seen by the judge." Id. at 4. Mr. Walker remained in jail for six
days because he was arrested on the Thursday before Labor Day, and the City of Calhoun did
not hold court on Monday because it was a holiday. Id. at 4-5. Because he remained in jail
for six days, Mr. Walker was unable to take his prescribed medication for his mental disorder.
Id. at 5.
74 See id. at 4 (noting that Mr. Walker "received three different answers" in response to
his questions about when he would go to court).
72
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cannot afford to pay the secured bail amount generically set by the
City of Calhoun."75 This practice results in the systematic detention
of indigent defendants. Further, Georgia law states that "at no
time.., shall any person charged with a misdemeanor be refused
bail." 76 Mr. Walker alleges that, contrary to Georgia law, the City
of Calhoun's policy was to release individuals arrested for
misdemeanors or minor traffic offenses if they could pay the bond
amount set for the charge "pursuant to an offense-based and pre-set
bail schedule," but to hold those individuals who were unable to pay
in jail until their first court appearance.7 7 In addition, Mr. Walker
alleges that unlike other jurisdictions, the City of Calhoun does not
allow for the release of misdemeanor arrestees "on recognizance or
with an unsecured bond . . ... 7 Instead, the City of Calhoun
requires that "the payment amount be made up front."79 The
plaintiff class sought a declaration that the City of Calhoun's bail
system was unlawful, seeking to enjoin the City of Calhoun from
enforcing its bail policies and requesting damages on behalf of Mr.
Walker for the harm he "previously suffered as a result of the City
80
of Calhoun's ... conduct."
On January 28, 2016, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia granted plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction. 8 ' The district court ordered the City of
Calhoun to implement "lawful post-arrest procedures," and, in the
interim, "release any other misdemeanor arrestees in its custody, or
who come into its custody, on their own recognizance or on an
unsecured bond in a manner otherwise consistent with state and
federal law .... "82 The district court stated that Mr. Walker and
the plaintiff class had a "substantial likelihood of succeeding on the

75 Id. at 12-13.
76
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1) (2017). Under this statute, most arrestees in Georgia accused of
misdemeanors are entitled to pretrial release.
77 Complaint at 5-6, Walker, No. 4:15-cv-00170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612.
78 Id. at 6.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 13-14.

Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017).
82 Id.
It is important to note that the district court determined that the City of Calhoun's
Standing Bail Order, adopted after this lawsuit was filed, did not moot Mr. Walker's claims.
The Standing Bail Order failed to remedy the constitutional deficiencies of the City of
Calhoun's prior bail system.
81
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merits of [their] claims" 83 based on Supreme Court and other circuit
precedent. It concluded that "[a]ny bail or bond scheme that
mandates payment of pre-fixed amounts for different offenses to
obtain pretrial release, without any consideration of indigence or
other factors, violates the Equal Protection Clause." 84 The City of
Calhoun appealed the order.
On March 9, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the district court's preliminary injunction on procedural grounds,
holding that the preliminary injunction violated Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65's specificity requirements. 85 The Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for further
proceedings. 86 Thus, the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims were not reached.8 7 On remand, the district court entered a
more specific injunction, dismissing the City of Calhoun's
arguments and stating that "[t]his is not an opportunity for [the]
[d]efendant to re-litigate the merits of the underlying preliminary
injunction [o]rder."8 8 The City of Calhoun has again appealed the
district court's injunction.

III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIXED, MONETARY BAIL
SYSTEMS

This Note argues that fixed, monetary bail systems violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
section begins by analyzing the constitutionality of fixed, monetary
bail systems through the lens of Walker v. City of Calhoun. It is
important to note, however, that this analysis is limited to the
merits of the constitutional claim itself and does not address the
question of whether the City of Calhoun could, in fact, be held liable
for the municipal court's bail system.8 9 Next, this section discusses
other jurisdictions that continue to employ unconstitutional bail
Id. at *10, *13.
Id. at *10.
85 Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 F. App'x 721, 724 (11th Cir. 2017).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
June 16, 2017).
89 One issue in the case concerned whether the City of Calhoun could be held liable under
§ 1983 for the bail system because it did not explicitly regulate the system by ordinance or
other resolution.
83
84
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systems like the system at issue in Walker. Finally, this section
offers recommendations for changing the law regarding bail
systems and practical advice for implementing new systems.
A. A CASE STUDY: WALKER V. CITY OF CALHOUN

As discussed above, the City of Calhoun employs a fixed,
monetary bail system, meaning it sets offense-based, pre-fixed bail
amounts for misdemeanor and traffic offenses. 90 The amount varies
Those
by offense, but usually ranges from $90 to $1,000.91
defendants that can afford the bail amount are immediately
released from custody, while indigent defendants-those who are
unable to afford the bail and cannot afford to pay a bonding agentremain detained until their first court appearance. Such a system
fails to provide an individualized assessment of an indigent
defendant's ability to pay. It also unfairly ignores facts indicating
that a defendant is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community. Thus, the City of Calhoun's bail system, and other
similar systems, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Overview of ConstitutionalPrecedent. The Supreme Court has
stated time and time again that a defendant's indigency should not
impact his or her access to justice. The Supreme Court has
continually reaffirmed the notion that denying release to a
defendant, without an individualized assessment of that
defendant's indigence and other methods available to achieve a
legitimate government interest, is unconstitutional. 92 Further, the
Court has noted that individuals should "be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard before being deprived of their liberty or

90 Complaint at 3, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 4:15-cv-00170).
91 Id. at 2.
92
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.

660 (1983); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, 14, Walker v. City
of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682
F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH) (taking the same position as this Note
regarding the constitutionality of the City of Calhoun's bail system and noting that there is
"a long line of cases" in which the Court "has repeatedly reaffirmed that denying access to
equal justice, without meaningful consideration of indigence and alternative methods of
achieving a legitimate government interest, violates the Fourteenth Amendment").
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property." 93 While a local jurisdiction retains the right "to
determine which rights and penalties beyond what the Constitution
minimally requires are appropriate to achieve its legitimate
interests, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a jurisdiction from
categorically imposing different criminal consequences ...

on poor

indigence." 94

While the
people without accounting for their
following cases have arisen in contexts outside of pretrial detention,
their holdings shed light on how the Court would address the City
95
of Calhoun's fixed bail system or other similar bail systems.
This Supreme Court precedent begins with Griffin v. Illinois.96
In Griffin, the Court analyzed whether the state of Illinois could
deny appellate review of a criminal conviction to indigent
defendants while granting such review to other defendants.9 7 The
petitioners, Griffin and Crenshaw, were convicted of armed robbery,
and immediately upon their conviction by the trial court, filed a
motion requesting a certified copy of the entire record, including a
transcript of the proceedings. 98 The petitioners requested these
documents at no cost because they were financially unable to pay
for them.9 9 Under Illinois law at this time, a defendant had to
furnish a certified report of the proceedings at trial to the appellate
court, which is impossible to prepare without a transcript of those
proceedings. 10 0 While indigent defendants who were sentenced to
death were provided the documents for free, all other criminal
defendants were required to cover the cost of those documents
themselves, without regard for their ability to pay.101

93 Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 27, Walker
v. City of Calhoun, 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)).
94 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Walker, 2016 WL 361612 (No. 1610521-HH).
95 See id. at 17 (arguing that the Supreme Court's reasoning in cases in the post-conviction
and sentencing contexts "apply with equal, if not greater, force in the bail context").
96 See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
97 See id. at 13 (stating that the issue presented to the Court was whether the state of
Illinois may administer the statute at issue "as to deny adequate appellate review to the poor
while granting such review to all others" and remain consistent with the equal protection
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98

Id.

99 Id.

100 See id. ("Under Illinois law in order to get full direct appellate review of alleged errors
by a writ of error it is necessary for the defendant to furnish the appellate court with a bill of
exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge.").
101 Id.

at 14.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

17

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 9
1000

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:983

The Court held the Illinois statute unconstitutional and
explained that a state may not grant appellate rights "in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty." 10 2 While the Court did not require the state to "purchase
a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot
buy it," the Court did hold that the state must find other means of
"affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent
defendants." 10 3 This case illustrates, albeit in a context outside of
bail administration, the Court's concern with providing all
defendants with equal access to justice.
Then, in 1970, the Court struck down another Illinois law that
violated the rights of indigent defendants. 10 4 In Williams v. Illinois,
the defendant was convicted of petty theft and received the
10 5
maximum sentence-"one year imprisonment and a $500 fine."
The Illinois statute provided that if, after a one-year sentence, the
defendant was still in default for failing to pay the fine and court
costs, then the defendant must remain in jail to "work off' the
monetary obligations at a rate of five dollars per day. 10 6 Because
the defendant was unable to pay the fine and court costs of $505, he
remained in prison for an additional 101 days over his sentence of
one year, which was the statutory maximum sentence at this
time. 10 7 The Court held that the state cannot "subject a certain class
of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the
1 08
statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency."
Next, in 1971, the Court again held that incarcerating an
indigent defendant solely because of an inability to pay is
unconstitutional. In Tate v. Short, the defendant was convicted of
nine separate traffic offenses, which accumulated into fines totaling
approximately $425.109 The defendant was unable to pay the fines
because of his indigency, and as a result, he was committed to a
''municipal prison farm according to the provisions of a state statute

103

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.

104

See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970) (holding that incarcerating a defendant

102

beyond the statutory maximum term because he or she cannot pay a fine or court costs is
unconstitutional).
105 Id. at 236. The defendant was also taxed five dollars in court costs, bringing the total
to $505. Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
at 236-37.
108 Id. at 241-42.
109 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396 (1971).
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....,"110 According to the state statute, the defendant was required
to remain and work at the "prison farm," with payment for his work
at a rate of five dollars a day, until he was able to satisfy the fines.11 1
As in Williams, the Court explained that the defendant's
imprisonment was unconstitutional because it "subjected [him] to
imprisonment solely because of his indigency."1 12 The Court noted
that the pretrial detention scheme was defective because it failed to
consider "other alternatives to which the State may constitutionally
resort to serve its concededly valid interest in enforcing payment of
fines."1 13 Thus, even in the 1970s, the Court made it clear that
courts must consider methods other than monetary bail for assuring
legitimate government interests like assuring appearance at trial or
preventing harm to the public, particularly when dealing with
indigent defendants.
In 1983, the Court addressed this equal protection issue in the
post-conviction context. In Bearden v. Georgia, the defendant
11 4
pleaded guilty to burglary and theft by receiving stolen property.
The trial court, pursuant to the Georgia First Offender's Act,
sentenced the defendant to probation on the condition that he pay a
$500 fine and $250 in restitution. 115 The defendant, who was
illiterate, was later laid off from his job and was unable to find
work.1 16 Before the balance was due, the defendant notified the
probation office that he would be unable to pay the remaining
amount because he could not find a job. 117 The state, however, filed
a petition "to revoke [the defendant's] probation because he had not
paid the balance." 1 After an evidentiary hearing, the defendant
was sentenced to serve the remaining probationary period in
prison.1 1 9
110 Id. at 396.
111 Id. at 396-97. To pay the total fine of $425, the defendant would have to remain at the
municipal prison farm for a total of eighty-five days. Id.
112

Id. at 397-98.

113 Id. at 399.
114 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 660 (1983).
115 See id. at 662 (explaining in more detail that $100 was payable that day, $100 was
payable the next day, and the remaining $550 balance was to be paid over the span of four
months); see also Georgia First Offender's Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 (2012).
116 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662-63.
117

Id. at 663.

118

Id.

"9 See id. (explaining that the trial court revoked the defendant's probation for his failure

to pay the fine and restitution, entered a conviction, and sentenced him to serve the remaining
period in prison).
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The Court held that revoking the indigent defendant's probation
for his failure to pay "without determining that [the defendant] had
not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate
alternative forms of punishment did not exist" violated the
defendant's
constitutional
rights
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment. 120 The Court, in emphasizing the importance of
considering alternative means to achieve legitimate government
interests, noted that this practice effectively punished the
defendant for his poverty. 121
Finally, in United States v. Salerno, the Court was faced with the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.122 Specifically, the
Court analyzed whether the pretrial detention provided for under
the Act violated substantive due process under the Fifth
Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 12 3 While the Court did uphold the Act and its pretrial
detention provisions as constitutional, it noted that defendants who
have not yet been convicted of an offense have a strong liberty
interest.124 Because of that liberty interest, the Court stated,
"detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
125
exception."
The Court's precedent is consistent and clear. States cannot
treat defendants differently based solely on their ability to pay. All
defendants, rich or poor, must be provided with an equal
opportunity for justice. And, while courts can impose monetary
conditions on defendants in certain circumstances, the Court has
stated repeatedly that alternative methods of achieving legitimate
government interests must be considered, particularly when a
defendant is indigent and unable to pay for his or her release from
custody.
2. The City of Calhoun's Bail Scheme Is Unconstitutional. On
appeal, if the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals should reach the
merits of Mr. Walker's constitutional claims, it should find that the
City of Calhoun's fixed, monetary bail system, which requires
120
121

Id. at 661-62.
See id. at 662 (explaining that the trial court effectively turned a fine into a prison

sentence).
122 See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
123 See id. at 746-52 (discussing the pretrial detention provided for under the Act and
explaining why such pretrial detention is not facially unconstitutional).
124 Id. at 755.
125
Id.
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payments of offense-based, pre-set bail amounts for certain types of
misdemeanor and minor traffic offenses, is unconstitutional. The
City of Calhoun's system disregards a defendant's ability to pay,
fails to consider alternative methods for achieving the City's
interests like protecting the public and preventing flight before
trial, and results in the arbitrary detainment of indigent defendants
solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release. Such a
system contradicts established Supreme Court precedent and
Georgia law.
The City of Calhoun's bail system is precisely the type of system
the Court imagined in Salerno as unconstitutional because it results
in the deprivation of a defendant's liberty solely because of a
defendant's indigency. The City's bail system pre-sets monetary
bond amounts for a variety of misdemeanor and minor traffic
offenses; the system provides for no individualized assessment of a
defendant's ability to pay, his or her flight risk, or his or her danger
to the community. 126 In fact, because of the limited financial
resources of indigent defendants, they are less likely than other
defendants to be deemed a flight risk, further supporting the notion
that the deprivation of their liberty prior to trial is unreasonable
and does not further a legitimate government interest.
If a defendant in Calhoun is unable to pay the pre-set amount,
he or she will remain in jail until his or her first court appearance,
which is sometimes as long as seven days from the initial arrest.127
While many defendants arrested in Calhoun are released from
custody shortly after payment of the bail, indigent defendants who
are financially unable to pay will remain detained for varying
amounts of time. 128 Mr. Walker, for example, was detained for six
days simply because he was unable to pay the $160 amount. 129 Mr.
Walker is not alone; his complaint alleges that there are typically
four to six defendants present in court each week in Calhoun who

126 Complaint at 5-6, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 4:15-cv-00170).
127 Id. at 6 (explaining that, because Calhoun only holds court once a week, any arrestee
who is unable to make the required payment could spend up to seven days in jail prior to his
or her first court appearance).
128 See id. at 6-7 (outlining the City's typical practices and procedures regarding
defendants arrested for misdemeanor or minor traffic offenses).
129 Id. at 4-5.
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had been detained simply because of their inability to pay for their
130
release.
While some supporters of such bail systems, and the City of
Calhoun in Walker, argue that pre-set bail schedules are neutral on
their face, the Supreme Court has consistently explained that
practices and procedures that result in the incarceration of only
indigent individuals are not neutral in their operation. 131 The Court
has clarified that systems that punish for poverty infringe on due
process and equal protection rights. Because the City of Calhoun's
system results in the incarceration of indigent defendants-while
defendants who can pay the pre-set bail amount are automatically
released-the system unconstitutionally discriminates against
those who are indigent.
In sum, the City of Calhoun's bail system has clear constitutional
deficiencies. A jurisdiction may not use a system that results in the
repeated incarceration of indigent defendants without any
consideration of their ability to pay for their release or alternative
methods of achieving trial appearance and public safety. Not only
does this system violate the Constitution, it also constitutes bad
public policy, resulting in increasing numbers of pretrial detainees
132
and the overcrowding of local jails.
B. CALHOUN IS NOT ALONE: THE CONTINUED USE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BAIL SYSTEMS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Today, six out of ten people in jail are pretrial detainees. 133 In
2009, only 23% of all felony defendants in the United States were
released on their own recognizance, while 61% posted monetary
13 4
bail, making monetary bail the clear norm in the United States.
Despite clear, established precedent that bail schemes imposing
Id. at 7.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH).
132 See id. at 13 ("In addition to violating the Fourteenth Amendment, such bail systems
result in the unnecessary incarceration of people and impede the fair administration of justice
for indigent arrestees.").
13
See SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 7, at 29 (explaining that actual pretrial release practices
are at odds with the fundamental idea that defendants should be released from custody unless
they pose a flight risk or present a danger to the community).
134
See id. (noting that this was done "either by providing the whole or a portion of the total
amount or equivalent collateral, or by hiring a bail bondsman to post the sum in the form of
a private surety bond for a non-refundable fee.").
130

131
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pre-set financial conditions, without consideration of an individual's
indigence or alternatives of assuring an individual's appearance at
trial and the safety of the public, are unconstitutional, jurisdictions
throughout the United States continue to use and maintain these
Although some efforts have been made by the
systems. 135
Department of Justice to work with state and local courts to reform
their systems and promote constitutional bail practices, 136 bail
amounts have continued to increase in recent years, resulting in
more defendants remaining incarcerated simply because they
137
cannot afford to pay for their release.
The inequities of bail systems employed across the country have
not gone unnoticed in recent years. Over the past five years,
litigation has arisen in states across the country as individuals and
advocacy groups challenge the constitutionality of fixed, monetary
bail systems that lead to the systematic incarceration of indigent
defendants. For example, in Illinois, a judge recently entered an
order prohibiting courts from setting bail beyond what a defendant
can pay.1 38 In Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court recently held that judges must consider defendants' ability to
pay when setting bail amounts. 13 9 And, in Texas, a federal judge
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining a county's bail
practices. 140
In response to the recent attention surrounding bail
administration, many states have recognized the deficiencies of
their bail systems and have attempted reform. For example, in
2017, New Jersey instituted a new risk assessment system in place

See generally id.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated by 682 F. App'x 721 (11th
Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH).
137 See SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 7, at 29 ("The average bail amount in felony cases
increased 43 percent (in constant dollar values) between 1992 and 2009, from $38,800 to
$55,400. As a result of these factors, more and more defendants remain in jail simply because
they cannot pay their way out.").
138 Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2018) (citing Richard A. Oppel Jr., Defendants Can't Be Jailed
Solely Because of Inability to Post Bail, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2vwx861 [https://perma.cc/6CWF-8A22]).
139 See Note, supra note 138, at 1129 (citing Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949,
954 (Mass. 2017)).
140 See Note, supra note 138, at 1129 (citing ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d
1052, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 2017), affd by modified 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018).
135
136
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of its traditional monetary bail scheme. 4 1 Colorado and Kentucky
have also attempted to institute risk assessment tools in their
pretrial detention system. 142 The California state government is
1 43
also considering passing a statewide bail reform statute.
Even in states with revised bail systems, however, indigent
defendants continue to be incarcerated at higher rates than other
defendants. In the state of Washington, for example, judges are
given a set of considerations to analyze when deciding whether to
release or detain a defendant prior to trial-similar to the Bail
Reform Act's considerations previously discussed.1 44 Washington's
rules explicitly states, "cash in exchange for release is a last-resort
option."1 45 A retired Superior Court judge, however, explained that
"the inclination in [the] community is to set bond without careful
1 46
consideration of factors in the rule."
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

States that have attempted to reform their bail systems by
creating lists of factors for judges to consider when deciding whether
to release or detain a defendant prior to trial, like the Washington
example above, have been largely unsuccessful. 147 This Note argues

141 See Note, supra note 138, at 1130 (citing AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J. ET AL., THE
NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL 5-7 (2016)).
142 See Note, supra note 138, at 1130 (citing COLO. CRIMINAL DEF. INST. ET AL., THE

COLORADO BAIL BOOK: A DEFENSE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ADULT PRETRIAL RELEASE 4

(2015); Kentucky Pretrial Release Manual, THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy,
Frankfort, Ky.), June 2013, at 19-21).
143 See Note, supra note 138, at 1130 (citing Editorial, Los Angeles County Tiptoes Forward
on Bail Reform, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-bail-reform-20170304-story.html
[https://perma.cc/ Y2PY-QRAD]; Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.,
Governor Brown, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, Senator Hertzberg and Assemblymember
Bonta Commit to Work Together on Reforms to California's Bail System (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19917 [https://perma.cc/4DVB-SHNR]).
144 See generally Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R., CrR 3.2; see also Mitch Ryals, The Price of
Freedom, INLANDER (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.inlander.com/spokane/the-price-offreedom/Content?oid=2557671 ("The rules tell judges to consider violent criminal history and
missed court dates, but also employment, enrollment in school, volunteer work, financial
assistance from the government and housing.").
145 See Ryals, supra note 144; see also Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R., CrR 3.2(d)(6) (listing
relevant factors to consider when determining whether "conditions of release will reasonably
assure the accused's appearance").
146 See Ryals, supra note 144.
147 See id. (noting that judges in Spokane, Washington set bail 76% of the time, and in 55%
of those cases, the defendants remained in jail).
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that the most effective way to eliminate bail systems' inequitable
impact on indigent defendants is to eliminate monetary bail entirely
for misdemeanor offenses, substituting monetary bail for
nonmonetary alternatives like personal recognizance or release to
local monitoring programs.
Constraints on the commercial
bondsmen industry, such as allowing defendants to pay a
percentage of the bail amount to the court directly, have also showed
promise.
For example, in the District of Columbia, monetary bail is
illegal. 148 It is one of the few jurisdictions in the United States that
does not require a defendant to post any monetary bail amount to
be released from custody. 149 Instead, the District of Columbia relies
on a preventive detention statute that allows judges to detain only
150
those defendants they believe are too dangerous to be released.
Under this system, "about 85 percent of defendants [in D.C.] are
151
released on their own recognizance or to a monitoring program."
These monitoring programs have proven to be just as successful at
1 52
assuring appearance at trial as monetary bail requirements.
And, judges in other states have indicated that they would be more
likely to release defendants if there were more effective monitoring
programs in place. 153 Overall, the District of Columbia's nonmonetary system has proven successful.
Eliminating the commercial bondsmen industry has also been
successful in decreasing the number of indigent defendants
incarcerated due to an inability to pay for their release. Oregon, for
54
example, has ridded itself of the commercial bondsmen industry. 1
Instead of paying a nonrefundable fee to a bondsman, defendants in
Oregon can pay the court ten percent of their bail amount
directly. 155 When defendants return to court for trial, they get their
money back. 56 Thus, the state achieves its goal of assuring
148

Id.

149

David O'Boyle, Going Against the Grain: D.C.'s No-Bail PretrialRelease System, DC

BAR (July 13, 2016), https://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/news/dc-no-bail-release.cfm.
150 Ryals, supra note 144.

Id.
See O'Boyle, supra note 149 (explaining that D.C.'s "system of monitoring defendants,
who have to regularly check in with the court in one way or another, is just as compelling as
bail requirements in ensuring their appearance at trial").
153 Ryals, supra note 144.
151

152

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id.
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appearance at trial by incentivizing defendants to appear in court
to get their reimbursement, while placing less of a financial burden
on indigent defendants.
There are some downsides to these proposed solutions. First,
implementing vigorous monitoring programs is both expensive and
time consuming. Further, unless the programs are well-developed
and organized, they likely will not achieve the goal of assuring
Second, performing an
defendants' appearance at trial.
individualized assessment of each defendant's ability to pay, their
flight risk, and their danger to the public is undoubtedly less
Despite these
efficient than using pre-fixed bail schemes.
challenges, requiring monetary bail will almost always
disadvantage those who are indigent. Because bail bondsmen
typically charge 10% of the total bail amount and often require
collateral in case of default, most indigent defendants remain
detained without a solution. Some efficiency must be sacrificed to
prevent the systematic violation of indigent defendants'
constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION

As the United States has grown, the notion of bail has evolved to
fit society's needs. The primary function of bail, to "safeguard the
' 157
courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defendants,"
however, has been lost. Today, instead of assuring the presence of
a defendant at trial or protecting the public, many bail systems
result in the incarceration of defendants solely because of their
indigency. The fixed, monetary bail system at issue in Walker is not
unique; jurisdictions throughout the United States continue to
employ pre-set, monetary bail schemes that violate indigent
defendants' due process and equal protection rights. While some
efforts have been made by state and local courts to reform their
current systems, it remains to be seen if these efforts will truly
make a difference in coming years.

157

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987).
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